We study the dynamic relation between daily stock returns and innovations in option-derived implied volatilities. By simultaneously analyzing innovations in index-level and firm-level implied volatilities, we distinguish between innovations in systematic and idiosyncratic volatility in an effort to better understand the asymmetric volatility phenomenon. Our results indicate that the relation between stock returns and innovations in systematic volatility (idiosyncratic volatility) is substantially negative (near zero). These results suggest that asymmetric volatility is primarily attributed to systematic influences (such as feedback of market-level volatility changes), rather than aggregated firm-level effects (such as leverage). We present new evidence that supports the assumption that innovations in implied volatility are good proxies for innovations in expected stock volatility. We also discuss our findings in relation to the implied volatility smile, the bias in implied volatility, return skewness, and hedging.
Introduction
Understanding the relation between stock returns and innovations in expected volatility is a fundamental issue in understanding financial markets. This relation has long been studied by financial economists (see, e.g., Cox and Ross (1976) , Black (1976) , and Christie (1982) ) and it is of practical importance for areas such as risk management, option pricing, and event studies.
Asymmetric volatility is a well documented empirical regularity in this area. The asymmetric volatility phenomenon (AVP) refers to the stylized fact that negative return shocks tend to imply higher future volatility than do positive return shocks of the same magnitude (see, e.g., Wu (2001) , Bekaert and Wu (2000) ). The AVP may also be described as a negative correlation between stock returns and innovations in expected volatility. 1 The AVP literature has primarily debated whether the AVP may be more attributable to firm-level effects such as leverage (a negative return shock causes increased volatility) or systematic market-wide influences such as volatility feedback (an increase in expected systematic volatility causes a negative return). 2 In this paper, we study the time series of stock returns and option-derived implied volatilities for the S&P 100 equity index and fifty large U.S. firms over 1988 to 1995. By simultaneously analyzing innovations in both index-level and firm-level implied volatilities, we distinguish between innovations in systematic and idiosyncratic volatility. 3 This decomposition allows us to contribute to the asymmetric volatility literature by distinguishing between systematic marketwide explanations and firm-level explanations for the phenomenon. Our findings also bear on 1 The strong form of the AVP, as termed by Bekaert and Wu (2000) , suggests a simple negative correlation between stock returns and volatility innovations where negative (positive) return shocks imply an increase (decrease) in expected volatility. By contrast, the weak form of the AVP suggests a negative correlation between stock returns and innovations in expected volatility, after controlling for the relation between the absolute return shock and the volatility innovation.
2 By referring to the leverage effect as a firm-level effect, we do not mean that changes in leverage could not induce changes in expected market-level volatility. For example, a decrease in expected future market-wide cash flows (or an increase in systematic risk-aversion) is likely to devalue equity more than corporate debt and thus increase market-level leverage, which could induce a higher expected market-level volatility. However, the leverage effect applies for each firm in isolation, regardless of whether the leverage changes are common across firms.
3 By "implied volatility innovations," we mean the daily change in implied volatility.
other areas of the literature where the relation between stock returns and innovations in expected volatility is an important consideration.
Our empirical investigation relies on the following intuition. Just as a firm's stock return can be decomposed into systematic and idiosyncratic components, innovations to a stock's volatility may be attributed to changes in systematic or idiosyncratic volatility. Systematic volatility shocks may result from macro events such as an interest rate shock or international financial crisis, while idiosyncratic volatility shocks may originate from firm-specific events such as product introductions and patent events. If the AVP is due more to systematic, market-level influences, then the negative relation between firm-level stock returns and volatility innovations should be primarily attributable to a negative relation between the stock returns and market-level volatility innovations. In contrast, if the AVP is more due to firm-level effects, then the negative relation between firm-level stock returns and volatility innovations should be similar for both market-level volatility innovations and idiosyncratic volatility innovations.
For the implied volatility in our empirical work, we use a standardized implied volatility (IV) that may be interpreted as an average IV from at-the-money call and put options with one month to expiration. Specifically, our standardized IV is a weighted average of eight different IVs, constructed in the same manner as the Chicago Board Options Exchange used to calculate their implied volatility index (VIX) over our sample period (see Whaley (1993) ). Use of this standardized IV both reduces measurement errors and mitigates the concern that daily IV changes are linked to variations in the option's moneyness and time to expiration. Our empirical approach is to assume that the daily change in our standardized IV is an observable proxy for innovations in the expected volatility of stock returns. We present new evidence that supports this assumption.
Our empirical contributions may be broken down into the following five areas, discussed in order of prominence for our study. First, we present new evidence about the dynamic relation between stock returns and innovations in expected volatility, as proxied for by the daily change in implied volatility. We find that the relation between index returns and index-level volatility innovations is substantially more negative (with a correlation of -0.679) than the relation between individual stock returns and the respective firm-level volatility innovation (with a median correlation of -0.165). Further, the negative relation between individual stock returns and index-level volatility innovations (with a median correlation of -0.339) is notably stronger than the negative relation between individual stock returns and their respective firm-level volatility innovation.
Second, we use a market-model variance decomposition to obtain an implied idiosyncratic volatility for each firm. We find that the relation between the individual stock returns and their respective innovation in implied idiosyncratic volatility is only marginally negative (with a median correlation of -0.046). This relation is not statistically different than zero for 37 of the 50 firms. These first two empirical contributions suggest that the AVP is more related to systematic market-wide influences, rather than an aggregation of firm-level effects.
Third, we present new evidence supporting the assumption that the daily IV changes are good proxies for the innovation in expected volatility. Many studies have evaluated the information in the IV level for the future volatility of realized stock returns. Recent findings indicate that the IV impounds nearly all information about future realized volatility (Christensen and Prabhala (1998) , Fleming (1998) , Blair, Poon, and Taylor (2001) , and Mayhew and Stivers (2003) ). However, the critical issue for our study is whether the daily changes in IV contain reliable incremental information about future return volatility, beyond the previous IV level. We are unaware of any other studies that have evaluated the incremental volatility information in the daily IV change.
Controlling for the IV level from period t − 2, we find that the IV innovation over period t − 1 contains reliable incremental information for stock volatility in period t. Further, we find that daily firm-level IV innovation contains more information about the respective firm-level volatility innovation than does the daily index-level IV innovation. These findings support the assumption that daily IV changes are a good proxy for the daily innovation in expected volatility.
Fourth, we examine the AVP in the traditional way by evaluating the relation between return shocks and conditional volatility in a time-series model. Our new wrinkle is to distinguish between firm-level and market-level return shocks when examining the AVP at the firm-level.
This exploration is motivated by our prior findings, which suggest that the asymmetry in the relation between conditional firm-level volatility and lagged return shocks will be greater for lagged market-level return shocks than for lagged firm-level return shocks. Consistent with earlier evidence (see, e.g., Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001)), we find that the AVP is stronger for index returns than for firm-level stock returns. Consistent with our first two empirical contributions discussed above, we also find that AVP behavior in firm-level conditional volatility is stronger and more reliable when relating firm-level conditional volatility to lagged market-level return shocks, rather than to lagged own-firm return shocks.
Fifth, note that a better understanding of the relation between stock returns and volatility innovations may also provide insight into other related areas of the literature, such as the IV smile, the bias in IV, return skewness, and hedging. Accordingly, we perform additional data analysis related to these topics and then discuss what our collective findings suggest for these areas. One key finding is that "index versus firm" differences in the relation between stock returns and volatility innovations are consistent with "index versus firm" differences in the slope of the IV smiles. However, even when controlling for the movements in IV suggested by the IV smile and the subsequent day's stock price change, the remaining relation between stock returns and IV innovations remains reliably and sizably negative. Overall, our additional analysis supports conclusions in other studies that indicate there are important differences between individual stocks and indices in the areas of option pricing and stock return behavior (see, e.g., Bakshi
and Kapadia (2003a), Bollen and Whaley (2004) , and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001)).
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and variable construction. Section 3 presents our primary findings on the dynamic relation between stock returns and innovations in expected volatility. Section 4 presents new supporting evidence on the information content in IV with respect to the future volatility of spot stock returns. Section 5 re-examines the AVP in the traditional approach that focuses only on stock returns and presents evidence that complements our primary findings in Section 3. Finally, Section 6 discusses other analysis and potential implications of our findings, and Section 7 concludes.
Data and Variable Construction 2.1 Stock Returns and Standardized Implied Volatility
We analyze 50 individual stocks with options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange.
Daily dividend-adjusted returns were obtained from CRSP for the period January 4, 1988, through December 31, 1995. The sample contains the 50 firms that had the highest total option trading volume over the period 1988 to 1995 and that met the following additional screens. First, the stock had to have the complete set of daily returns from CRSP and have the same ticker over our sample period. Second, each stock had to have adequate option data so that we could construct our standardized implied volatility (IV) for at least 1800 of the 2022 daily periods (approximately 90%). 4 We also examine two different stock indices in our empirical work. The primary index is the S&P 100 since it is the underlying asset for the index options that we examine. Total returns for the S&P 100 are obtained from DataStream International.
For comparison, we also analyze returns of the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stock index from CRSP in in order to evaluate a different, broader market index. In our empirical work, when we refer to the marketlevel stock return, we mean this broad CRSP index.
For the stock index IV in our empirical work, we use the Volatility Index (VIX) from the CBOE. This index represents the IV of an at-the-money option on the S&P 100 index with 22 trading days (30 calendar days) to expiration. It is constructed by taking a weighted average of the IVs for eight options, including a call and a put at the two strike prices closest to the money and the nearest two expirations (excluding options within one week of expiration). Each of the eight component IVs is calculated from the bid-ask quote midpoint using a binomial tree that 4 We choose an option-volume screen because of evidence in Mayhew and Stivers (2003) and this study that the quality of volatility information in implied volatility degrades appreciably for firms with thinly traded options. The Berkeley Options Data base lists 150 firms that have option volume listed in every year of our sample. The average trading volume for the largest 10 option-volume firms is about 9 times that for option-volume firms 41-50, 33 times that for option-volume firms 91-100, and 323 times that for option-volume firms 141-150. Thus, we feel that 50 firms is a good compromise between sample size (number of firms) and information quality in the data. The additional screens for return availability and standardized IV availability removed only eight of the top 58 option-volume firms.
accounts for early exercise and dividends. Note that each of the eight component IVs is a single observation of the traditional IV that features the assumptions of the Black-Scholes framework, except that the binomial model must be used to allow for early exercise. This procedure was designed to reduce noise and mitigate measurement errors. See details in Whaley (1993) and Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley (1995) .
For each firm, we construct a standardized IV using this same VIX procedure with the individual stock options. We believe this standardized IV is a good choice for our empirical work for the following reasons. First, when modeling return volatility, this type of IV has been shown to subsume nearly all of the information from the historical time-series of returns, at least for widely-traded options. 5 Second, we are interested in the relation between daily returns and daily changes in IV in the time-series. Errors in absolute pricing with the Black-Scholes framework should be less important for analysis that relies on IV innovations, rather than the IV level. In other words, we are not assuming that the Black-Scholes framework gives the correct option price, but that it is a good enough model to empirically control for changes in moneyness, the riskless rate, and time to expiration so that we can use market prices of options to investigate changes in the volatility implied from option prices. Third, our procedure focuses on near at-the-money options, which are the most widely traded and typically yield IVs that are relatively less biased.
Focusing on near at-the-money options also serves to standardize the daily IV observations since the IV may vary with the moneyness of the options (the well-known IV smile). Fourth, this standardization procedure mitigates measurement errors and avoids IV biases that may occur if one only examines calls (or puts). Fifth, we present additional evidence in Section 4 that supports our assumption that the daily changes in our standardized IV are good proxies for the daily innovation in the expected volatility of spot stock returns. Finally, our use of BlackScholes-framework IVs follows many previous studies, which facilitates comparisons with earlier work. 6 5 See Christensen and Prabhala (1998), Fleming (1998) In our subsequent empirical testing, we treat the missing standardized IVs as follows. First, for the testing that requires an IV level, we simply use the previous day's IV estimate. Using stale IV data in this case will create a small bias that suggests weaker explanatory power for the IV when trying to explain subsequent spot volatility. Second, when calculating correlations between daily stock returns and standardized IV changes (Table 2) , we throw out the observation whenever there is a missing standardized IV observation that prevents us from calculating a daily IV change. Third, for the maximum likelihood estimation in Tables 3 through 8 , we fill in missing values with the prior day's value of IV. For these models, this means the "daily IV change" is set equal to zero for days that originally had missing IV values. This treatment means that our analysis will tend to slightly understate the comovement between returns and IV changes for these models. 8 Table 1 reports summary statistics for our sample of 50 firms including the stocks' market the Heston (1993) option pricing model incorporates stochastic volatility. However, the Heston model requires the estimation of seven unobserved parameters to specify the dynamics of the underlying asset and this model was not in existence for over half of our sample. 7 This procedure of averaging the call and put implied volatilities when calculating the standardized IV reduces the estimation error for two reasons. First, to the extent that the noise due to microstructure is independent across options, it can be reduced by averaging multiple observations. Second, errors induced by using an incorrect dividend or interest rate will bias call and put estimates of implied volatility in opposite directions. So, averaging call and put implied volatilities mitigates such errors. For these reasons and because we felt it was more conservative, we only calculated a standardized IV when all eight individual IVs were available. 8 An alternate way to handle missing standardized IVs is to interpolate and assume that a missing observation of the standardized IV is equal to the average of the preceding period's value and the subsequent period's value. With this approximation, we could analyze the data set as if there are no missing values. Using this alternate interpolation method to handle missing values, we re-estimate our primary results in Section 3 and find essentially identical results (the correlations with this alternate approach are within 0.01 of the summary correlations reported in Table 2 ). Since both methods for handling missing values give the same answer, we present our tabular results using the method described in the main text since this method seems more conservative. capitalization (size), volatility of spot stock returns, IV level, daily IV variability, option trading volume, and the number of available standardized IV observations per firm. On average, over 92% of the days have valid observations for the standardized IV. We analyze the days with missing standardized IVs and do not find any apparent clustering where missing values tend to occur on the same day across firms, so we do not believe there is any systematic relation in the missing values. We also note that the number of standardized IV observations varies little with firm size. This suggests that any differences in our results related to firm size are unlikely to be related to variation in the number of available standardized IV observations. Table 1 also reports summary statistics for the largest and smallest size-based quintiles of the 50 firms, based on the firms' average size over our sample period. First, note that the median size of the largest ten firms is about 20 times that of the smallest ten firms. Second, note that the return standard deviation, the IV level, and the daily variability in IV are all appreciably larger for the smaller firms as compared to the larger firms. Third, note that the median option trading volume for the largest ten firms is about 7 times larger than that for the smallest ten firms. Thus, in our tables, we distinguish between the largest and smallest quintile of firms when reporting our findings in order to show how our results vary with firm size and the related variations in volatility, IV variability, and option trading volume. For brevity in our tables and because the most interesting variation is between the largest and smallest decile, we do not report the results for the other size quintiles in our tables.
Implied Idiosyncratic Volatility
Our work in the next section also uses an estimate of an individual stock's implied idiosyncratic volatility. We use the market model to decompose a stock's total IV into a systematic market-level component and an idiosyncratic component. Our procedure is as follows.
We start by estimating a market-model regression for each firm and retaining the estimated market beta. We estimate the following regression for each firm:
where R i,t is the stock return of firm i, R S&P 100,t is the S&P 100 return, ε i,t is the residual, and α i and β i are coefficients to be estimated for each firm i. The median (average) R 2 of the market-model (1) for our sample is 23.4% (24.7%), which indicates the substantial majority of the firms' volatility is firm-specific.
Then, using this retained β i and the variance decomposition implied by the market model,
we calculate an estimate of a firm's implied idiosyncratic variance as follows:
where IV
is the estimate of a firm i's idiosyncratic variance at time t, IV 2 i,t is firm i's standardized implied variance, β i is firm i's market beta estimated from (1), and V IX 2 t is the standardized implied variance of the S&P 100. We convert the implied idiosyncratic return variance to a standard deviation and then calculate the daily change in the implied standard deviation of the idiosyncratic return component (
This procedure results in a few firm-days where the estimate of implied idiosyncratic variance is negative. Across the 50 firms, the median (mean) number of days for a firm where the estimate of the implied idiosyncratic variance is negative is only 2 (25). 17 (32) of the 50 firms have no days (five days or less) where the estimate of the implied idiosyncratic variance is negative.
Negative values are implausible and we cannot convert the variance into a standard deviation.
Accordingly, we set the implied idiosyncratic variance to zero for these few firm-days where its value is negative. 9
9 This simple method to estimate the daily change in a firm's implied idiosyncratic volatility is open to other criticisms. First, it assumes a constant beta over the entire sample period. We have recomputed the time-series of the daily changes in idiosyncratic volatility using time-varying betas, calculated from rolling regressions on the preceding 500 daily observations. Across the 50 firms, the average correlation (median correlation) between the "daily change in idiosyncratic volatility using time-varying betas" and the "daily change in idiosyncratic volatility using a fixed beta" is 0.988 (0.992). Thus, over our sample, the dynamic behavior of the "daily change in idiosyncratic volatility" is nearly identical, whether one uses a constant beta or time-varying beta. Second, since we need both the market VIX and the firm's IV to estimate a day's implied idiosyncratic variance, the method is subject to noise in both these implied volatilities. Further, to calculate the daily change in implied idiosyncratic volatility, we need both the VIX and firm IV in consecutive trading days. Since we have some missing values in our daily time-series of our standardized IV, this means the average number of observations for the "daily change in idiosyncratic volatility" is limited to 1744 (out of 2022 possible days) across the 50 firms. Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, we feel that this measure of idiosyncratic volatility is useful because of the clear intuition of the measure, the consistency of the results across our sample of 50 firms, the consistency of the results across
The resulting estimates of the implied idiosyncratic volatility seem reasonable. The average (median) value of the implied idiosyncratic standard deviation across the 50 firms is 1.45% (1.41%) per day. We also compute the ratio of a firm's implied idiosyncratic variance divided by its total implied variance for each firm for each day. Across the 50 firms, the median (average) of this ratio is 0.755 (0.736), which is consistent with the R 2 obtained from estimating the marketmodel, equation (1), and also indicates that the substantial majority of a firm's volatility is idiosyncratic.
close to our point estimate. 10 Second, in contrast to the sizable negative correlation for the index, the average (median) correlation between individual stock returns and the respective own-firm volatility innovation is only -0.163 (-0.165). Thus, the correlation at the index level is over four times the average value for the individual stocks.
Third, we find that the mean (median) correlation between the individual stock returns and the index volatility innovation is -0.330 (-0.339) across the fifty stocks. The correlation between the individual stock returns and the index volatility innovation is more negative than the correlation between the individual stock returns and the respective own-firm volatility innovation for 46 of the 50 firms. In our view, this suggests that the AVP is more related to systematic, market-level influences (rather than firm-level influences). This is because the negative correlation between firm-level stock returns and volatility innovations is stronger for market-level volatility innovations than for firm-level volatility innovations.
Fourth, the notion that the AVP is primarily related to market-level volatility innovations suggests that the correlation between the individual stock returns and innovations in their expected idiosyncratic volatility should be near zero. We calculate the correlation between the individual stock returns and the change in their respective implied idiosyncratic volatility (calculated per Section 2.2). As reported in column 3 of Table 2 , the mean (median) of these correlations is near zero at only -0.047 (-0.046).
Finally, as reported in the final column in Table 2 , note that the correlations between the firm IV innovations and the VIX innovations are modest. This is consistent with the fact that most of a firm's volatility is firm-specific and suggests that multicollinearity between the firm 10 Poteshman (2000) uses S&P 500 option prices to estimate this correlation by minimizing the sum of squared option pricing errors. He examines the June 1988 to August 1997 period and estimates this correlation to be -0.61. Benzoni (2002) uses a two-stage approach where he first estimates the structural parameters of the dynamic process from daily S&P 500 index prices by using a simulated method of moments estimation. In the second stage, he uses the estimated price dynamics to examine S&P 500 index options and estimates the risk adjustment necessary for option pricing. His estimate of the correlation between the spot price increment and the variance increment is -0.58. Finally, Pan (2002) uses an "implied-state" generalized method of moments estimation that uses spot prices and option prices jointly. She examines weekly observations over the January 1989 to December 1996 period and estimates a correlation of -0.53 for the case that allows a risk-premia for stochastic volatility but no jump dynamics.
IV innovations and the VIX innovations should not be a concern for the follow-on multivariate analysis reported in Table 3 .
Multivariate Analysis
Next, we investigate the dynamic relation between stock returns and expected volatility innovations in a multivariate framework that allows for conditional heteroskedasticity in stock returns.
We note that our specifications here are not meant to imply economic causality between stock returns and innovations in the standardized IVs. Rather, the specifications are meant to examine the reliability of the statistical relation between stock returns and volatility innovations, which is important for practical applications such as risk management, option pricing, and event studies.
To begin with, we investigate the relation between individual stock returns and volatility innovations in a model that includes own-firm IV innovations and index IV innovations simultaneously. We estimate the following system:
where R i,t is the daily return of individual stock or stock index i, ε i,t is the return residual, h i,t is the conditional variance of ε i,t , IV 2 i,t is the standardized implied variance of stock i (VIX 2 t for the S&P 100 and CRSP index), ∆IV i,t is the daily change in the individual firm's implied volatility, ∆V IX t is the daily change in the CBOE's VIX, D For this model and all our subsequent specifications that model both the conditional mean and variance, the system is estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood estimation using the conditional normal density. Inference about estimated coefficients for our maximum likeli-hood estimation in this paper is based on robust quasi-maximum likelihood standard errors, in accordance with Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). estimates are more reliably negative than the ψ 1 estimates.
In Table 3 , Panel A, we also report the R 2 from an ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation of different variations of the mean equation (3) . For the OLS estimation with both ∆V IX t and ∆IV i,t as explanatory variables, the average of the R 2 s is 13.5% across the 50 firms. The sizable R 2 also suggests a substantial negative relation between stock returns and volatility innovations.
Next, in a variation of (3) where the own-firm IV innovation is the only explanatory variable, the average R 2 across the 50 firms is only 3.4%. In contrast, in a variation of (3) where the VIX innovation is the only explanatory variable, the average R 2 across the 50 firms is over three times as large at 11.9%. Thus, both in terms of statistical significance of the coefficients and of R 2 evaluation, the relation between the firm returns and index volatility innovations is stronger than the relation between the firm returns and own-firm volatility innovations.
We also estimate the model over the 1988-1991 and 1992-1995 subperiods and report summary results in Table 3 . The results for both subperiods are qualitatively similar to those for the overall sample.
Next, we isolate the relation between individual stock returns and the innovations in their respective implied idiosyncratic volatility by estimating the following model:
where
is the daily change in the individual firm's implied idiosyncratic volatility (based on the market-model variance decomposition described in Section 2.2) and the other terms are as defined for (3) and (4). term (ψ 6 ) are negative and significant for only 13 of the 50 firms with a modest mean (median)
value of -0.021 (-0.013). Further, the average R 2 for an OLS estimation of (5) is only 0.66%, which is quite small compared to the R 2 values in Panel A. Subperiod results are consistent.
Finally, in Table 3 , Panel C, we report index-level results for the S&P 100 and CRSP indices.
We find a very reliable negative relation between the index return and the index volatility innovation. The R 2 s seem very substantial at 46.9% for the S&P 100 and 43.8% for the CRSP index.
Again, subperiod results are consistent. Thus, the evidence in Table 3 reinforces the findings in Table 2 , again indicating that the negative relation between stock returns and expected volatility innovations is primarily related to the market-wide component of expected volatility.
In Table 3 , we do not report the estimated coefficients for the variance equations for brevity.
The coefficients are consistent with findings in Mayhew and Stivers (2003) . The ψ 4 estimates on the IV 2 i,t−1 term are positive and significant at a 1% p-value for all 50 firms and both indices.
The IV 2 i,t−1 term capture nearly all of the volatility information. 11
Cross-sectional Variation in Results
We do not attempt a formal analysis of cross-sectional variation in our results because we have only 50 individual firms in our sample, because we employ reduced form empirical models, and because we have no obvious theoretical motivation. Further, since options are widely traded for only a modest proportion of publicly traded firms, a broad cross-sectional analysis is not possible.
However, as we noted in Section 2, there are appreciable differences across the size quintiles of firms in terms of the stock's spot return volatility, the IV level, the daily variability in IV, and the option trading volume. These size-related variations motivate our choice to differentiate our results across size quintiles in each table.
For all five quintiles, the correlation between stock returns and index IV innovations is appreciably more negative than the correlation between stock returns and own-firm IV innovations.
This consistency is important when considering what our evidence suggests about the AVP. our results are largely consistent across these different size quintiles.
We do note a few apparent size-related differences. First, the negative relation between stock returns and IV innovations in Tables 2 and 3 is stronger for the larger firms, both in the relation between stock returns and own-firm volatility innovations and in the relation between stock returns and index volatility innovations. In particular, the relation between stock returns and own-firm volatility innovations is appreciably weaker for the smallest quintile of firms. Part of this trend may be due to poorer quality information in IV for the smaller firms, since they tend to have appreciably lower option trading volume. Consistent with this conjecture, we also find in later analysis that the volatility information from the IV innovation appears somewhat weaker for the smallest quintile of firms (see Table 4 ).
We do extend our analysis regarding the relation between VIX-innovations and stock returns. To summarize, the results in this section suggest that the asymmetric volatility phenomenon is more related to systematic market-wide influences, rather than aggregated firm-specific influences. This conclusion relies upon the key assumption that innovations in our standardized IV are a good proxy for innovations in expected volatility, an issue which we examine next. Another concern is that the daily VIX innovation might contain more incremental information about future firm-level volatility than do the daily firm-level IV innovations, perhaps due to a higher signal-to-noise ratio in the more widely traded index options. If so, this could help explain why we find larger comovements between individual stock returns and index IV innovations than between individual stock returns and own-firm IV innovations.
First, we investigate the incremental volatility information in the lagged own-firm IV innovations by estimating the following model:
where R i,t is the daily return of individual stock i, R M,t is the market-level stock return, ε i,t is the return residual, h i,t is the conditional variance of ε i,t , IV 2 i,t is the daily implied variance of stock i at time t, ∆IV 2 i,t−1 is the one-day change in the stock option's implied variance from the end-of-period t − 2 to the end-of-period t − 1, and the γs are estimated coefficients. 12 The coefficient of interest is γ 5 on the ∆IV 2 i,t−1 term.
We report results in Table 4 . We find that the ∆IV 2 i,t−1 term provides reliable incremental information about future stock volatility. For 37 of the 50 firms, the estimated coefficient on the Table 4 , although the information in the IV innovation for the larger firms (with higher option trading volume) seems to be of somewhat higher quality.
The interpretation of the results in Section 3 also depends on whether there is reliable volatility information in the daily innovation in the index IV. To address this issue, we estimate a specification that retains (7) as the conditional mean equation and uses the following conditional variance equation:
where ∆V IX 2 t−1 is the one-day change in the implied variance of the S&P 100 index from the end-of-period t − 2 to the end-of-period t − 1 and the other terms are as defined for (7) and (8) .
Here, the coefficient of interest is γ 6 on the ∆V IX 2 t−1 term.
The results are reported in Table 5 . We find that the daily VIX innovation provides very reliable incremental information about future volatility for both the S&P 100 and CRSP stock index. At the firm-level, the daily VIX innovation also tends to provide incremental volatility information. Across the 50 firms, the mean (median) of the γ 6 estimates is 0.866 (0.714), which is close to the γ 6 estimated for the S&P 100 return. The γ 6 estimates are positive (negative) and statistically significant for 14 (1) of the 50 firms at the 5% level. For the individual stocks, 12 We include the lagged returns as explanatory variables in (7) and subsequent mean equations in Sections 4, 5, and 6 in order to control for microstructure effects and as a crude control for time-varying expected returns. In practice, the lagged return terms explain almost nothing. Across the fifty firms, the average (median) R 2 for an OLS estimation of (7) is only 0.0036 (0.0027). In Section 3, we did not include lagged returns as explanatory variables in (3) and (5) because it complicates the interpretation of the R 2 s reported in Table 3 and because of the unimportance of the lagged return terms, relative to the IV-innovation terms.
the number of γ 6 estimates that are statistically significant seems modest, which likely reflects the high proportion of idiosyncratic volatility in firm returns and our use of the sizable quasimaximum likelihood robust standard errors.
Further, for 49 of the 50 firms, we find that the likelihood function value is less than that for the system of (7) and (8) . Overall, these results support our use of the daily IV innovation as a proxy for the change in the expected return volatility.
Finally, our interpretation of the "implied idiosyncratic volatility" from Section 3 requires that this measure be informative about the conditional volatility of the idiosyncratic component of firm-level stock returns. We evaluate this issue with the following model: (11) where R i,t is the daily return of stock i, R S&P 100,t is the daily S&P 100 index return, ε idio i,t is the idiosyncratic return residual, h idio i,t is the conditional idiosyncratic return variance, IV
2,idio i,t
is the daily implied idiosyncratic variance of stock i at time t from (2), ∆IV
is the daily change in the firm's implied idiosyncratic variance, and the φs are coefficients to be estimated.
Since the market-return term (the φ 1 term in (10)) controls for market-wide volatility, this is a model of idiosyncratic volatility. We find that both the lag-two implied idiosyncratic variance term (the φ 3 term) and the lag-one change in implied idiosyncratic variance term (the φ 4 term) are both reliably positive. For the 50 firms, the median φ 3 estimate is 0.68, and the φ 3 estimates are positive and statistically significant for all 50 firms. The median φ 4 estimate is 0.52, and the φ 4 estimates are positive and statistically significant for 35 firms. 13 Thus, these results support 13 Note that using the idiosyncratic volatility derived from equations (1) and (2) when estimating the system of (10) and (11) means the estimation is a two-step procedure, which assumes that the φ 1 from (10) and the β i from (1) are effectively the same. We present this two-stage method so that we can use the same simple idiosyncratic volatility that we use in Section 3 and Tables 2 and 3 . For robustness, we also estimate a more complex one-stage model that replaces the IV 
Asymmetric Volatility with a Return-based Approach
Next, we investigate the AVP in our sample with the return-based approach that has been widely used in the literature. By return-based, we mean that the time-varying conditional volatility is estimated as a function of the previous period's return shock (see, e.g., Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993), Bekaert and Wu (2000) , and Wu (2001)). This exploration is motivated by our results in Section 3, which suggest: (1) that asymmetric volatility behavior will be stronger for index returns than for firm-level returns, and (2) that firm-level asymmetric volatility behavior will be stronger when modeling firm-level conditional volatility as a function of the lagged marketlevel return shock (rather than the own-firm return shock). In terms of the modeling specification, our new wrinkle here is to distinguish between firm-level and market-level return shocks when examining the AVP at the firm-level.
To begin with, we first analyze the traditional asymmetric volatility behavior where the conditional firm volatility (index volatility) is modeled as a function of the own-firm (own-index) return shocks. Instead of estimating a traditional asymmetric GARCH model, such as the version in Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993), we use the IV from period t − 2 to control for volatility information from t − 2 and older. This specification allows us to isolate the AVP behavior related to the period t − 1 return shock and incorporates empirical evidence that the volatility information in IV largely subsumes volatility information from older return shocks.
Asymmetric Volatility with Lagged Own-Stock Return Shocks
We estimate the following system to evaluate the traditional univariate AVP in a given firm's (or index's) returns: individual stocks, the AVP related to the lagged own-firm's return shocks is much weaker than that for the indices. The mean (median) θ 6 estimate across the 50 firms is only 0.033 (0.024) and the θ 6 estimates are positive and statistically significant for only 7 of the 50 firms. 14 Further, in contrast to the strong-form AVP in the index returns, both positive and negative return shocks are positively related to future volatility for the individual stock returns, with negative return shocks implying only a marginally higher volatility. There is little variation in this AVP across the different size quintiles, except for the smallest quintile where the AVP is essentially non-existent.
Firm-level Asymmetric Volatility with Lagged Market-level Return Shocks
To evaluate the asymmetric volatility relation between firm-level return volatility and lagged market-level return shocks, we estimate a specification that retains (12) as the conditional mean equation and uses the following conditional variance equation:
where R 2 M,t is the squared market-level return, D − M,t is a dummy variable that equals one if R M,t is negative and zero otherwise, and the other terms are as defined for (12) and (13) . The primary coefficient of interest is θ 8 , which allows for the AVP with the lagged market-level return shocks. Table 7 reports the results. We find that the AVP in firm-level returns is much more prominent when modeling the volatility as a function of lagged market-level return shocks, as compared to the univariate approach in Table 6 . Here, we find that the average (median) of the θ 8 estimates is sizable at 0.188 (0.178), which indicates that lagged negative return shocks imply a higher In regard to cross-sectional variation, we note that the largest quintile of firms has noticeably stronger asymmetric volatility behavior with respect to the lagged market-return shocks in the Table 7 model. On the other hand, there is little apparent variation across firm size in the univariate AVP in Table 6 . If the AVP is more of a systematic market-level phenomenon, this result seems consistent with the observation that these large firm returns also have a more negative relation with the index volatility innovations (as reported in Section 3).
To conclude, using a return-based approach to re-examine the AVP in our data, we make two observations. First, the asymmetric volatility behavior is more reliably evident in the index returns than in the firm-level returns. This first observation is consistent with prior findings that have contrasted index versus firm behavior, such as in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001). Second, we contribute with a new finding that indicates the asymmetric volatility behavior is more sizable and reliably evident in firm-level volatility when relating the firm-level conditional volatility to the lagged market-level return shock (instead of the own-firm return shock). Both observations above seem consistent with our primary findings in Section 3.
Discussion of Results and Other Related Analysis
In Sections 3 through 5 we presented our primary findings, which indicated: (1) In this section, we discuss how our primary results may relate to other areas of the literature.
Specifically, a better understanding of the relation between stock returns and volatility innovations may also bear on issues such as the implied volatility smile, the bias in implied volatility, return skewness, and hedging. Additional data analysis is included to support our discussion.
The Implied Volatility Smile
The variation of IV across strike prices for options on the same underlying stock with the same expiration, commonly referred to as the IV smile, has been the subject of much research. As We also investigate the IV smile in our data with an interest in how it may interrelate with our primary dynamic findings. In our work, we characterize the variation in IV across strike prices with a single slope estimate since we are only concerned with the modest variation in strike prices for the near at-the-money options (since this magnitude of strike-price variation corresponds to the magnitude of daily stock returns). Consistent with the previous studies, we find that the IV slope across strike prices for near at-the-money options is substantially more negative for the index options than for the individual stock options. Thus, the "index versus individual stock" differences in the IV smile are suggestive of the "index versus individual stock" differences in the dynamic relation that we find between stock returns and IV innovations.
The extent of the relation between the slope of the IV smile and our dynamic findings is an empirical question. If the IV smile is more related to the moneyness of an option, then our results
should not be appreciably related to the IV smile since we control for the option's moneyness when forming our standardized IV. Further, evidence from Bollen and Whaley (2004) We extend our analysis by calculating an "excess IV change" that equals the "simple IV change" minus the "change in IV suggested by the slope of the prior period's IV smile and the day's realized stock price movement." We find that the dynamic relation between stock returns and the "excess IV changes" remains sizable and reliably negative. The magnitude of the dynamic relation between stock returns and "excess IV changes" is somewhat smaller than the dynamic relation between stock returns and "simple IV changes" (modestly lower for the index IV and appreciably lower for the own-firm IVs). We conclude that our dynamic findings are consistent with the slope of the IV smiles, which suggests our results may also contribute to a better understanding of the IV smile. However, the dynamic relation between stock returns and IV innovations remains sizable and reliably negative, even when controlling for the IV change suggested by the prior period's IV smile and the day's stock price change. 15 
The Bias in Implied Volatility
We are also interested in whether our primary dynamic findings might bear on understanding differences in the IV bias between firm-level and index-level options. It is well-known that the implied volatility from index options tends to be higher than the subsequent realized volatility from spot returns. See Poteshman (2000) and Chernov (2001) for a summary of this evidence.
Recent findings indicate that the bias in implied volatility is smaller for individual stock options;
see Bakshi and Kapadia (2003a) and Bollen and Whaley (2004) .
To investigate the IV bias in our sample, we estimate two variations of the following model:
where R i,t is the daily stock return of individual stock i or the S&P 100 index, R M,t is the daily market-level stock return, ε i,t is the return residual, h i,t is the conditional variance of ε i,t , IV 2 i,t is the implied daily variance of either the S&P 100 index or the respective stock, and the λs are coefficients to be estimated for each stock.
As pointed out by Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1993) , this method is subject to the critique that the conditional volatility horizon is a one-day-ahead volatility whereas the IV implies volatility over a 30-day horizon. However, it seems unlikely that this maturity mismatch will impart a systematic error in the bias over an eight-year sample of daily returns. Further, we are interested in the contrast in the IV bias when comparing index and individual stock options, rather than whether IV has an absolute bias. Thus, we believe this approach is valid for illustrating the contrast between the IV biases, especially given the magnitude of the differences that we find.
15 Details of the method and results for the "excess IV change" are available in an appendix from the authors.
The results are reported in Table 8 . Model 1 examines only the bias by restricting λ 3 to zero. For the S&P 100, the IV is higher than the realized market volatility, which indicates the well-known bias in index IV. The λ 4 estimate is significantly less than one, indicating that the implied variance is biased about 34% too high.
However, the IV from the individual stock options exhibits little bias. For the 50 firms, the mean (median) of the λ 4 estimates is essentially one at a value of 0.999 (0.999). For 31 of the firms, the statistical tests fail to reject a null hypothesis that λ 4 is equal to one. Further, for the 19 firms that reject the hypothesis that λ 4 equals one, the results are mixed as to whether λ 4 is greater than or less than one. For 7 (12) firms, λ 4 is statistically greater than one (less than one). Thus, our findings do not indicate any systematic directional bias in IV at the firm-level.
The contrast in the IV bias between firm-level and index options is consistent with findings in
Bakshi and Kapadia (2003a) and Bollen and Whaley (2004) . Table 8 reports on the unrestricted version of (15) and (16) . If IV is informationally efficient and unbiased, then we expect to find the λ 3 estimate to be essentially zero and the λ 4 estimate to be essentially one. On average, our firm-level results are consistent with this notion of informational efficiency and unbiasedness. For 38 (37) of the 50 firms, we cannot reject the null that the λ 3 (λ 4 ) estimate equals zero (one). For the index-level results, we also find that we cannot reject the null that the λ 3 estimate equals zero. Thus, the results in Table 8 support our assumption that IV is informative about future spot return volatility.
Model 2 in
As far as relating the "firm versus index" differences in the IV bias to the "firm versus index" differences in our primary findings in Section 3, earlier work has argued that the bias in index options is likely due to a stochastic volatility risk premium in option prices (see, e.g., Coval
and Shumway (2001) and Bakshi and Kapadia (2003b) ). Further, Bakshi and Kapadia (2003a) suggest that the volatility risk premium is smaller for individual stock options, as compared to index options. Our collective findings seem consistent with these conclusions. Since we find evidence that there seems to be a much smaller relation between stock returns and volatility innovations for individuals stocks than for indices, it seems intuitive that there would also be a smaller volatility risk premium in individual stock option prices. These observations suggest that it is important to distinguish between systematic and idiosyncratic volatility.
Return Skewness
Prior studies such as Harvey and Siddique (1999) and Heston (1993) have noted a link between negative return skewness and the AVP. Accordingly, we evaluate the skewness in continuouslycompounded returns for our 50 firms and the S&P 100 index. We find that the S&P 100 index returns have a large negative skewness of -0.520 versus a near-zero skewness for the firm-level stock returns (with a median skewness of 0.043). These skewness differences are suggested by the large differences that we find when comparing the AVP behavior of index versus individual stock returns. Further, the largest 20 of our firms have both a more negative return skewness and a more negative correlation between the stock returns and index volatility innovations, as 
Hedging Implications
Our results also have implications for hedging practices. As in Bakshi, Cao, and Chen (2000), our findings about the dynamic relation between stock returns and IV innovations indicate that simple hedging strategies might not perform as well as one might expect. For example, consider an active investment strategy that goes long a diversified portfolio of undervalued stocks and hedges against market risks with index options. In a Black-Scholes world, one could protect the diversified portfolio from market risk (for small price movements over small periods of time)
by either going long puts or by writing calls in the proper ratio. However, our results suggest substantial differences between using long puts or short calls. During a market downturn, our results indicate that one is likely to see an increased IV. If one has bought index puts for this hedge, this means the value of the put is likely to increase more than predicted by the Black-Scholes, and you may be over-hedged. On the other hand, if one has written index calls for this hedge, then during a market downturn the value of the call will decrease less than predicted by the Black-Scholes, and you would be under-hedged or your hedge position could even be risk-increasing (the value of the call could even increase).
Our results suggest that these concerns are more important when dealing with portfolios and index options and less important when dealing only with individual stocks and their options.
This is because the negative correlation between individual stock returns and changes in ownfirm implied volatilities is much more modest than the negative correlation between index returns and changes in index implied volatilities.
Conclusions
We study daily stock returns and option-derived implied volatilities for the S&P 100 equity index and fifty large U.S. firms. Our empirical investigation yields new evidence that promotes a better understanding of the dynamic relation between stock returns and volatility innovations and the nature of the asymmetric volatility phenomenon.
Our work assumes that the daily change in our standardized implied volatility (IV) is an observable proxy for innovations in the expected return volatility of stock prices. With this assumption, we can jointly analyze changes in firm-level and index-level IV in order to distinguish between innovations in systematic and idiosyncratic volatility.
We have four primary findings concerning the dynamic relation between stock returns and expected volatility innovations. First, we find that index returns have a large negative relation with innovations in expected index volatility. Prior research has reported comparable index-level results but with methods substantially different than ours. Second, we find that individual stock returns have only a modest negative relation with innovations in their own expected volatility.
Third, we find that the negative relation between individual stock returns and index volatility innovations is sizably stronger than the negative relation between individual stock returns and their own-firm volatility innovations. Fourth, we decompose the total implied volatility of the individual stocks into a systematic and idiosyncratic component. We then find that the relation between individual stock returns and their respective idiosyncratic volatility innovation is near zero. Subperiod analysis yields consistent results for all these findings.
The implications of this evidence for the asymmetric volatility phenomenon depend upon the key assumption that IV changes are good proxies for innovations in the expected stock volatility.
We present new evidence that indicates the daily changes in both firm-level and index-level IVs contain reliable incremental information about the future volatility of the respective stock or index. Further, we find that changes in own-firm IV provide more incremental information about the future volatility of the respective firm than do changes in index IV. Thus, our findings support the key assumption that IV changes are good proxies for innovations in expected stock return volatility, both for the index and for individual stocks.
If one accepts this key assumption, then our comovement findings have clear implications for understanding the asymmetric volatility phenomenon. If asymmetric volatility is better explained by systematic market-wide influences, then the negative correlation between stock returns and volatility innovations should be primarily attributable to a negative correlation between stock returns and market-level volatility innovations. Conversely, if asymmetric volatility is better explained by firm-level effects (with the aggregation of firm-level effects explaining index return behavior), then the negative correlation between individual stock returns and volatility innovations should be similar for both market-level volatility innovations and idiosyncratic volatility innovations. Putting the pieces together, our findings suggest that the asymmetric volatility phenomenon is more related to systematic market-level influences (or a top down effect), rather than aggregated firm-specific influences (or a bottom up effect). Our evidence seems consistent with conclusions in Bekaert and Wu (2000) and suggests that it is important to distinguish between systematic and idiosyncratic volatility.
Finally, we re-examine the asymmetric volatility phenomenon using the traditional returnbased approach. Our results are consistent with our primary findings that relate stock returns and IV innovations. Of primary interest, we find that the asymmetric volatility behavior in firm-level volatility is stronger when relating firm-level volatility to the lagged market-level return shock than when relating firm-level volatility to its own lagged return shock. On a secondary level, we also discuss how our primary findings may relate to other areas of the literature, such as the IV smile, the bias in IV, and return skewness. We conduct additional data analysis to support this discussion. Our collective evidence supports conclusions in other studies that indicate there are important differences between individual stocks and stock indices in the areas of option pricing and return behavior. Our collective findings also suggest it is important to distinguish between idiosyncratic and systematic volatility in these areas. S&P 100 n/a -0.679 n/a n/a CRSP n/a -0.663 n/a n/a Index 
where R i,t is the daily return of individual stock or index i, ∆IV i,t is the daily change in the individual firm's IV, ∆V IX t is the daily change in the CBOE's VIX (∆IV terms are all in "annualized standard deviation" units), ∆IV The table reports on the information content of the daily IV change for the conditional volatility of individual stock returns. We estimate the following model:
where R i,t is stock i's daily return, R M,t is the market-level stock return, ε i,t is the return residual, h i,t is the daily conditional variance of ε i,t , IV Table 4 model is greater than that for the comparable Table 5 where R i,t is the daily return of individual stock i or the S&P 100, R M,t is the market-level stock return, ε i,t is the return residual, h i,t is the conditional variance of ε i,t , IV 2 i,t is the daily implied variance of stock i (VIX for the S&P 100), and the λs are estimated coefficients for each stock or index. For each size-based group of individual stocks in column one, we report the mean and median for the coefficients of interest.
For λ 3 (λ 4 ), the number in brackets reports the number of firms where the estimated coefficient is greater than zero/less than zero (greater than one/less than one) and significant at a 5% p-value. For the index, t-statistics are in parentheses for a test that the coefficient is different than zero (different than one) for λ 3 (λ 4 ). Also, for the index model in the final row, the λ 2 term is omitted. The sample period is 1988 through 1995. 
